Market framing around US deals is slightly misleading—the 1.5 Mt threshold has already been massively exceeded, and forward capacity looks robust even without US involvement. The main risk to a YES outcome would be a severe, systemic disruption to DRC’s mining sector, which current trends and investment signals do not indicate.

DRC copper is already a multi‑million‑tonne producer and is on track for >3 Mt in the mid‑2020s; the 1.5 Mt bar is extremely low, and US mineral diplomacy affects who buys the copper more than how much is produced.

Publicly available production data already has DRC copper output at more than double the 1.5 Mt threshold, with credible forecasts showing further growth into 2026–27; unless the platform uses an idiosyncratic definition of “supply capacity,” this market looks materially underpriced on YES.

The bar of 1.5 Mt is now very low relative to current DRC copper output; unless the resolution criteria interpret “due to US deals” in an unusually strict or counterfactual way, the fundamentals strongly favor YES.

The DRC has already more than doubled the 1.5 Mt/year bar, and all published forecasts through 2026–27 show either flat or rising output; the main uncertainty is interpretive (how strictly resolution criteria link the outcome to US deals) rather than about physical capacity.

DRC copper capacity has already surpassed the 1.5 Mt threshold and is projected to grow further; unless the market’s resolution criteria apply an unusually strict causal interpretation to “due to US mineral deals,” this looks like a very likely YES.